JUSTICE BREYER: All right, if I believe that that is just out of the question, it's so complicated, nobody could do it, it would [*45] be a radical change, Congress could never have intended that, what about a much simpler approach? What you would do is take 3553(b), and you say, "Read the word 'shall' -- i.e. 'shall apply the guidelines' -- to 'may,'" so that the guidelines become advisory, either because the "shall" becomes a "may" or because you give each judge the power to give any reasonable reason at all as to why the Commission's guideline, they didn't actively consider this factor. In other words, read 3553(b) as permissive. And now, assuming I've expressed myself on the underlying Apprendi questions, so I, but suppose Blakely does apply, would you -- is -what would be wrong with taking that approach?That was Booker and Justice Scalia was quite cocky as to "shall" does not mean "may." But somehow he found a new dictionary when it came time to write the opinion in Castle Rock v. Gonzales, and decided that he would interpret the Colorado statute at issue so that every shall was magically turned to a discretionary shall or a may. The statute reads in part (taken from Court's opinion):
MR. CLEMENT: Assuming I understand the approach you propose, there would be nothing wrong with taking that approach.
JUSTICE BREYER: All right, I have thought of one thing that might be wrong.
JUSTICE BREYER: So I'll ask you about it, if you want.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Could it be that "shall" [*46] does not mean "may"? Right?
JUSTICE SCALIA: Oh, that's not it? "Shall" -
JUSTICE BREYER: All right, well, I -- you see nothing wrong with that. That makes the guidelines advisory, and there are a number of objections -- maybe not, maybe big, maybe small. One objection I was worried about is -- I'm giving you my thought process, you know, and I -- because I'm trying to get a -- your response -- is that if we did take that approach, you'd leave the appellate section in place. That means every time the judge didn't use the guideline, the appeals courts would have to review for reasonableness. Now that would be in place. We would discover judges all over the country having different views on that. Courts of appeals would have different views about was or what was not reasonable. We would be here to review those differences, and we would become the sentencing commission. I thought I had escaped.
JUSTICE BREYER: Now, how, how serious an objection is that? Or do you recommend that, if [*47] you lose on this point, we take the approach of, in that way, making the guidelines advisory?
“YOU SHALL USE EVERY REASONABLE MEANS TO ENFORCE THIS RESTRAINING ORDER. YOU SHALL ARREST, OR, IF AN ARREST WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SEEK A WARRANT FOR THE ARREST OF THE RESTRAINED PERSON WHEN YOU HAVE INFORMATION AMOUNTING TO PROBABLE CAUSE THAT THE RESTRAINED PERSON HAS VIOLATED OR ATTEMPTED TO VIOLATE ANY PROVISION OF THIS ORDER AND THE RESTRAINED PERSON HAS BEEN PROPERLY SERVED WITH A COPY OF THIS ORDER OR HAS RECEIVED ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THIS ORDER.” Ibid.Nino, you are less than consistent. As a matter of fact, you have done in Castle Rock that which you so much complain of: you made up the law to suit the result you wanted.